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Imagine that law enforcement agencies, using a profiling 
program, stop and search only people of a particular 
ethnicity within a specific area. The results are astounding: 
seven drug dealers and two robbers on the run were 
caught. Once in court, all defendants claim the arrest was 
discriminatory because of an obviously biased profiling 
program. Their attorneys argue that the evidence obtained 
as a consequence to the tainted arrests, must be excluded 
and that only this removal of the fruit of the poisonous tree 
will motivate legal authorities to closely monitor policing 
programs and prevent bias as best as they can. On the 
other side of the room, victims and members of the public 
want justice. They consider the use of algorithms to bring 
perpetrators before the law to have been a success.  
Administration of criminal justice and profiling 
Predictive policing has triggered a heated debate around 
the issue of false positives. Biased machine training can 
wrongly classify individuals as high risk simply as a result 
of belonging to a particular ethnic group and many agree 
such persons should not have to shoulder the burden of 
over-policing due to an inherent stochastic problem (cf. 
Veale,Van Kleek, and Binns 2018). True positives, or 
individuals who are correctly identified as perpetrators, do 
not make headlines. If drugs or other incriminating 
evidence is found in their possession after being stopped 
and searched, the fact that such evidence was found using 
biased profiling is justified because the suspicion turned out 
to be well-founded. Had the police officer identified them, 
their colleagues would probably laud them for “good 
intuition.” Scholars have demonstrated that sorting by 
stereotypes is a form of generalization all humans use 
routinely (Schauer 2003). However, as Hildebrandt (2008, 
30) explained in Profiling the European Citizen, with
theories of normativity between law and machine learning 
77 
automated profiling the need to effectively constrain such 
practices in order to prevent a technological infrastructure 
that practically destroys fairness in criminal justice is 
eminent.  
This provocation argues that the ‘true positives’ offer the 
best opportunity to address the issue of biased profiling. 
The first reason is purely pragmatic – they are already 
party to a criminal investigation and, as such, have a 
strong incentive to challenge law enforcement methods and 
scrutinize policing methods on an individual basis. The 
second reason is more general (and commonly subscribed 
to) – that discriminatory stops and searches are inherently 
unfair, threaten social peace, and frustrate targeted groups 
(DeAngelis 2014, 43). Use of biased algorithms in policing 
not only places a burden upon those deemed ‘false 
positives’, but also contaminates the ‘true positives’. To 
create an efficient legal tool against discriminatory law-
enforcement, defence should be entitled to contest a 
conviction for biased predictive policing, with a specific 
exclusionary rule protecting ‘true positives’ against the use 
of tainted evidence. 
The legal standing of “true positives” 
The legal standing of individuals prosecuted following an 
arrest triggered by biased profiling is unclear. Even an 
outright illegal arrest may not affect prosecution, although 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has extended 
certain defense rights to the investigation phase (Allenet de 
Ribemont v. France 1995, 11-13, para. 32-37) and in 
certain situations, the defense may invoke exclusionary 
rules with reference to tainted evidence. The problem is 
that the exclusion of evidence is a controversial issue 
(Estreicher and Weick 2010, 950-51) and it remains 
unclear whether biased predictive policing would actually 
trigger such exclusion. Generally, where incriminating 
evidence is found, it is the responsibility of the authorities to 
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clarify the facts and enforce the law. After all, there is 
public interest not only in bringing criminals to justice, but 
also in supporting victims.  
By contrast, defendants have standing to claim that an 
arrest was discriminatory and unfair (Gillan and Quinton v. 
the United Kingdom 2010, 42-45, para. 76-87) and it is in 
the public interest to stop biased police work and 
discriminatory arrests. How to resolve the conflict between 
the interests of the public to obtain justice while 
simultaneously honouring a defendant’s rights depends on 
the composition of each criminal justice system. However, 
all systems are faced with the issue of biased policing to 
some degree and all, to a certain extent, operate on the 
(yet controversial) premise that a threat of excluding 
evidence will deter authorities from particular practices 
(Kafka 2001, 1922-25). Therefore, adopting an 
exclusionary rule appears to be the obvious solution.  
Creating a specific legal remedy for the ‘true positives’ is 
the most promising way to deter biased predictive policing. 
Such individuals are already in the courtroom and can 
raise appropriate objections while the ‘false positives’ 
would have to initiate a new legal action and have little 
incentive to do so. Similarly, courts or administrative bodies 
empowered to monitor biased profiling may also lack the 
incentive to draw attention to biased law enforcement 
practices in the absence of a powerful legal remedy for 
‘true positives’. 
Exclusion of evidence: A price too high to pay? 
Clearly excluding evidence obtained using biased 
predictive policing techniques will not be a popular remedy 
in most criminal justice systems. Objections around 
presumptions of guilt and subverting the interests of justice 
and the victims would likely be cited. However, if one 
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scrutinizes these arguments, they may turn out to be less 
convincing than initially thought. 
With reference to the first argument, Art. 6 (2) ECHR 
guarantees European citizens charged with a criminal 
offence are “presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to law.” Courts and legal scholars agree that the 
meaning of the presumption of innocence is broad. What 
they don’t agree on is whether or not the guarantee 
extends to investigations and other pre-trial actions and it is 
not explicitly stated in the Convention. However, according 
to the case-law of the ECtHR, members of the court may not 
begin criminal proceedings with the preconceived notion 
that an individual has committed the offence in question 
(Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain 1988, 27, 
para. 77; Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 1995, 11-13, 
para. 33-36). Referring to this line of cases, scholars 
correctly argue that if the presumption of innocence is not 
extended to police profiling it will lose its place as a 
guiding principle in the era of ubiquitous surveillance and 
big data.  
Regarding the second argument, implicit in the objection to 
an exclusionary rule barring fruit of the poisonous tree is 
concern that the wheels of justice will lose momentum if a 
perpetrator is allowed to walk free despite incriminating 
evidence. This dichotomy is present for every exclusionary 
rule and invokes our traditional goals of punishment and 
deterrence. However, there is also the understanding 
among citizens that authorities will prosecute crimes 
properly. This involves integrity in both the investigation 
and subsequent legal proceedings so that individuals 
against whom the state has a valid case do not walk free. 
The public’s interest in honesty and transparency in 
investigations provides protection from arbitrary justice and 
supports the notion that law enforcement agencies should 
monitor their profiling programs for implicit bias. The EU 
lawmaker acknowledges this interest with provisions on 
accountability in prosecution where automated profiling 
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carries the risk of prohibited discrimination (cf. Art. 11 
para 3 and Art. 10 Directive (EU) 2016/680).1  
Support for the exclusion of tainted evidence may also be 
found in the protection against unreasonable detention. 
According to Art. 5 (c) ECHR, no citizen’s liberty may be 
deprived except in limited situations, including where there 
is “reasonable suspicion” that the individual committed an 
offense. The ECtHR has noted that this requirement that the 
suspicion be reasonable forms an essential part of the 
safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention. More 
specifically, ‘having a “reasonable suspicion” presupposes 
the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an 
objective observer that the person concerned may have 
committed the offence’ (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the 
United Kingdom 1990, 12, para. 32; Ferguson 2015, 
286). 
In the case of a human police officer, he or she must 
identify enough elements, or ‘probable cause’, to satisfy an 
objective observer regarding the possible guilt of an 
individual. In contrast, a police profiling system based upon 
algorithms does not just monitor one potential subject, but 
categorizes individuals in a way that assumes certain 
groups are more likely than others to commit crimes, thus 
deserving of additional police attention. If such profiling 
leads to a search and subsequent arrest, no individual law 
enforcement agent has ex ante identified any probable 
cause for the arrest. In fact, he or she may never know 
how the data was formed that resulted in the arrest. This 
hardly constitutes the reasonable suspicion required by the 
ECHR. 
Justification of an exclusionary rule is also supported by 
the principle of equality before the law, which is central to 
any democracy. If police action is based on algorithms that 
divide a population into groups based upon particular 
attributes, the result will be a fundamental change to our 
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legal system characterized by an increase in unlawful 
searches and detainment, in addition to violations of the 
privacy and liberty of all citizens. It will result in the 
Orwellian world in which ‘some animals are more equal 
than others’ and Big Brother is watching you. That said, 
one would be mistaken to assume that law enforcement 
agents were ‘colour-blind’ prior to the advent of automated 
profiling, but to date, biased searches by human officers 
have not paved the way to specific exclusionary rules.  
Willingness to pay the price 
With predictive policing programs on the rise we must be 
willing to pay the price of a strong exclusionary rule. A 
rule barring incriminating evidence found in the possession 
of a ‘true positive’ after a discriminatory arrest can be 
grounded in two lines of reasoning. The first is legal and 
builds upon the rationale that an overpoliced individual 
can invoke an exclusionary rule on the basis of an 
unreasonable search. The second line of argument is as 
simple and straightforward as it is pragmatic: there is 
public interest in creating an efficient legal tool against 
biased profiling and against unmonitored use of such 
programs (Hildebrandt 2015, 184, 195). Therefore, it is 
the ‘true positives’ that offer us the best chance to require 
authorities to monitor their profiling tools due to the 
inherent incentive in pointing out potential bias and 
prohibited discrimination during an ongoing proceeding. 
Notes 
1 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA). 
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